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ABSTRACT 
The efficiency of current cargo screening processes at 
sea and air ports is largely unknown as few benchmarks 
exists against which they could be measured. Some 
manufacturers provide benchmarks for individual 
sensors but we found no benchmarks that take a holistic 
view of the overall screening procedures and no 
benchmarks that take operator variability into account. 
Just adding up resources and manpower used is not an 
effective way for assessing systems where human 
decision-making and operator compliance to rules play 
a vital role. Our aim is to develop a decision support 
tool (cargo-screening system simulator) that will map 
the right technology and manpower to the right 
commodity-threat combination in order to maximise 
detection rates. In this paper we present our ideas for 
developing such a system and highlight the research 
challenges we have identified. Then we introduce our 
first case study and report on the progress we have 
made so far. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The primary goal of cargo screening at sea ports and air 
ports is to detect human stowaways, conventional, 
nuclear, chemical and radiological weapons and other 
potential threats. This is an extremely difficult task due 
to the sheer volume of cargo being moved through ports 
between countries. For example in sea freight, 200 
million containers are moved through 220 ports around 
the globe every year; this is 90% of all non bulk sea 
cargo (Dorndorf, Herbers, Panascia, and Zimmermann 
2007). 
Little is known about the efficiency of current 
cargo screening processes as few benchmarks exist 
against which they could be measured (e.g. %detected 
vs. %missed). Some manufacturer benchmarks are 
available for individual sensors, but these have been 
measured under laboratory conditions. It is rare to find 
unbiased benchmarks that come from independent field 
tests under real world conditions. Furthermore, we have 
not found any benchmarks that take a holistic view of 
the entire screening process assessing a combination of 
sensors and also taking operator skills, judgment and 
variability into account. 
In our research we attempt to identify and test 
innovative methods in order to advance the use of 
simulation for supporting decision making at the 
strategic and the operational level of the cargo screening 
process. Wilson (2005) confirms the usefulness of 
simulation for the analysis and prediction of operational 
effectiveness, efficiency, and detection rates of existing 
or proposed security systems. 
Our research aim is to develop a methodology for 
building such Decision Support Systems (DSS) that will 
map the right technology and manpower to the right 
commodity-threat combination in order to maximise 
detection rates. The concept for such a DSS (a cargo 
screening process simulator) is shown in Figure 1. For 
developing the methodology we are using a case study 
approach. In our work we focus solely on DSSs 
development; we do not work on new sensor 
development. However, with our DSSs we might be 
able to give some recommendations of what 
characteristics new to be developed sensors might 
require to reach certain system performances. 
The core of the proposed cargo screening process 
simulator will consist of three elements: a Detection 
Rate Matrix (DRM), a simulation model and a resource 
optimiser. The DRM will provide sensor detection rates 
as an input for the sensors represented in the simulation 
model, based on sensor types, commodities, threats, and 
other indicators. The simulation model will allow 
carrying out what-if analyses for the system under 
examination. The results of the simulation will be fed 
into the resource optimiser to create a new set of input 
parameter values for the simulation. The previous two 
steps are repeated until an acceptable solution has been 
found. The output of the simulator will consist of 
required technology and manpower and an estimation of 
the system detection rate that can be achieved by 
implementing the proposed system set-up. A sensor 
data database will provide some information for the 
core elements (in particular for the DRM). The content 
of the database will be a mixture of data provided by 
vendors but will also consider operators experience with  
the equipment. Other input data required for the cargo 
screening process simulator include an annual job list, 
guideline on how to carry out jobs, and observations if 
jobs are carried out in accordance with these guidelines, 
and a list of existing sensors and staff. 
Section 2 contains a brief review of existing work 
in the field. In Section 3 we discuss the development of 
a DRM. In Section 4 we state our research questions 
regarding model design and matrix development. 
Section 5 introduces our case study, the ferry port in 
Calais. We present a description of the real system and 
its operations, a conceptual model of it, an 
implementation of the conceptual model in form of a 
discrete event simulation model, and finally we show 
the results of an initial test run with our simulation 
model. Section 6 concludes the paper by discussing the 
results of our current efforts and proposes further work. 
 
2. BACKGROUND 
Simulation modelling is commonly used to support 
design and analysis of complex systems. With regards 
to modelling ports Tahar and Hussain (2000) confirm 
that simulation modelling is a tool widely used for the 
management, planning and optimisation of port 
systems. According to Turner and Williams (2005) the 
same is true for the management, planning and 
optimisation of complex supply chain systems. 
In the context of the cargo screening process, some 
examples (e.g. Leone and Liu 2005, Wilson 2005) have 
been found that use simulation modelling to evaluate 
key design parameters for checked baggage security 
screening systems in airports, in order to balance 
equipment cost, passenger and baggage demand, 
screening capacity, and security effectiveness in an 
attempt to meet the requirements imposed by the 
checked baggage screening explosive detection deadline 
established by the US Aviation and Transportation 
Security Act.  
Another related subject is the enhancement of the 
security throughout the supply chain, i.e. achieving 
supply chain integrity (Closs and McGarrell 2004). 
Here, simulation modelling is often used to analyse the 
system. For example, Sekine, Campos-Náñnez, Harrald, 
and Abeledo (2006) use simulation and the response 
surface method for a trade-off analysis of port security 
in order to construct a set of Pareto optimal solutions. 
The development of a dynamic security airport 
simulation is described by Weiss (2008). In contrast to 
the other papers mentioned so far, this simulation 
focuses on the human aspects in the system and 
employs the agent paradigm to represent the behaviour 
of attackers and defenders. Both, attacker and defender 
agents are equipped with the capability to make their 
individual decisions after assessing the current situation 
and to adapt their general behaviour through learning 
from previous experiences. This allows accounting for 
rapid security adaptation to shifting threads, as they 
might be experienced in the real world. 
 
3. CONCEPTS OF THE DETECTION RATE 
MATRIX 
The mapping process (right technology and manpower 
to the right commodity-threat combination) will be 
implemented using a multi-dimensional DRM. The 
DRM contains the information required to estimate the 
type and amount of sensors and manpower we need in 
order to maximise our detection rate if we have an 
estimate of the number and type of cargo containers we 
want to screen and what they will contain. The values to 
fill the DRM can either come from vendors, the 
literature, from trials, or anecdotal evidence of the 
border agency staff. From all the information received 
we have to create a single value that represents the 
detection rate for a certain commodity-threat 
combination. 
An example for a partially filled DRM derived 
from laboratory experiments can be found in Klock 
(2005). Klock states that developing a DRM from real 
world data would be desirable but poses a big challenge 
as for various reasons it is a problem to collect all 
relevant data for the all commodity-threat combinations 
in the real system. In our case the problems are as 
follows. In most cases the security screening procedures 
cannot be compromised for research purposes, i.e. there 
are legal boundaries regarding the sampling frame. 
Furthermore, it would be difficult to capture the 
variability of operational procedures that exist in the 
real system. However, as much as the technology itself, 
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Figure 1: Conceptual Model of Our Cargo Screening Process Simulator 
the way in which the technology is used contributes to 
the success rate of detecting threats. Our current plan is 
to fill some of the gaps in our DRM by simulating 
specific scenarios, rather than trying to collect all data 
from the real system. 
We will start the development of our DRM by 
creating a two dimensional matrix and then gradually 
increase its complexity (i.e. the number of dimensions). 
The values for our first DRM will be derived by 
collecting anecdotal evidence from system insiders and 
where anecdotal evidence is not available by simulating 
specific scenarios of interest (1). The next step will be 
to generalise the initial DRM and to consider that the 
applicability and performance of sensors is related to 
the commodity screened and the category of threats 
investigated (2). For example, if one wants to detect 
stowaways in a lorry using CO2 probes which measure 
the level of carbon dioxide and the load consist of wood 
or wooden furniture which naturally exhumes carbon 
dioxide then the detector readings will be wrong. For 
this commodity the sensor is not useful and would 
produce many false positives (type 1 error), which 
means that in return many false negatives (type 2 error) 
will stay undetected as time is wasted with manually 
inspecting the wrong lorries. The next dimension we 
will add is a definition of the cargo containment which 
consists of a description of the type of containment, its 
wall thickness and its wall density (3). The containment 
type is important as some of the sensors might need to 
have access to the interior of the containment while 
others might be applicable to be used from the outside. 
Wall thickness and density are important as many 
sensors have limitations regarding the penetration of the 
containments, depending on the containment properties. 
 
rate of detection = f (commodity & thread 
 combination, specific scenario) 
 
(1) 
rate of detection = f (commodity, threat, sensor) 
 
(2) 
rate of detection = f (cargo containment, 
 commodity, threat, sensor) 
(3) 
 
There are many more dimensions one could add 
(e.g. cargo origin, cargo destination, shipping company, 
or environmental conditions of test facility location) and 
part of the research will have to deal with the question 
of which are the most relevant indicators of sensor 
efficiency? 
 
4. RESEARCH QUESTION 
One of the key questions we are keen on answering 
during our research is how and where it makes sense to 
use simulation in a project like ours. Besides the 
standard application areas for simulation modelling in 
operations research (e.g. system analysis, optimisation, 
as a communication tool) we want to find and test some 
new application areas (e.g. validating the DRM parts 
where we have data and helping to estimate the values 
where we have gaps in our DRM). Furthermore, we will 
examine if our simulation models can be used to 
support the decision making process in other fields, e.g. 
supply chain management or risk analysis. 
Before we can build our cargo screening process 
simulator we will have to investigate several questions 
which can be broadly grouped in two categories, related 
to model design or matrix development. Research 
questions regarding model design: [a] How much detail 
do we have to model to get some meaningful output? 
[b] How should we model people in our system (e.g. 
officers or stowaways) - as simple resources or as 
autonomous entities? [c] How can we get a good 
estimate on how many stowaways, weapons or drugs 
are passing the borders? [d] What effect does the fact 
that we are dealing with rare events have on input 
sampling and output analysis? Research questions 
regarding matrix development: [e] Which are the most 
relevant indicators of sensor efficiency? [f] What is the 
best way to develop and validate a detection rate matrix 
in absence of real data or when real data is incomplete, 
i.e. missing data for certain technology / commodity / 
threat combinations? [g] Can we develop a framework 
to support the development of a DRM for different 
environments and for different threats? 
 
5. CASE STUDY: CALAIS FERRY PORT 
In order to achieve our research aim of developing a 
methodology for building cargo screening process 
simulator we have chosen to use a case study approach. 
This allows us to gain the knowledge, insight, and 
experience we need for developing our methodology. 
For each case study we will first develop simulation 
models that allow us to analyse the system under study 
and then create a DRM for this system. 
For our first case study we have selected the ferry 
port in Calais (France) that links Calais with Dover 
(UK). This site is ideal for beginning as the security 
measures in place focus on detecting only one threat, 
illegal immigrants, or clandestines, as they are called by 
the UK Border Force. Clandestines are people found on 
a lorry with the aim to get into Britain without a 
passport or any other papers (Sky1 2009). These can be 
individuals or groups. Clandestines come in hope of a 
better future in Britain, drawn by the English language, 
the lack of national identity cards and the possibility of 
illegal work. When clandestines do not succeed little or 
no publicity is generated, thereby perpetuating the false 
idea that clandestines are always successful. On the 
other hand, for every successful clandestine arriving in 
Britain the word goes out that the process is successful, 
which generates even more attempts of illegal 
immigration (Brown 1995). 
 
5.1. The Real System 
Between April 2007 and April 2008 more than 900,000 
lorries passed the check points in Calais. Of these, 
approx. 0.3% contained additional human freight (UK 
Border Agency 2009). How many clandestines were 
missed during these checks is unknown. Although 
companies supplying the sensor technology promise a 
detection rate close to 100%, independent test have 
shown that this is not the case when using the 
equipment in real world scenarios (Klock 2005). In 
addition, in the real system the detection rates also 
depend on factors like the time of day (at busy times the 
operators have less time to apply the sensors and wait 
for the readings and therefore readings are more likely 
to produce more type I and type II errors), operators’ 
skills (of interpreting the outputs from the sensors), and 
operators’ fatigue. 
In Calais the cargo screening process is separated 
into two major zones, the first under the control of the 
Calais Chamber of Commerce (CCI), the second under 
the control of the UK Border Agency (see Figure 2). 
Different types of sensors are used at the various 
screening facilities and some of them are also in use as 
mobile devices. The technology / operations used for 
screening includes Passive MilliMetre Wave scanners 
(PMMW), Heart Beat Detectors (HBD), CO2 
measurement probes (CO2), canine sniffers and visual 
inspection. The process on the French site starts with a 
passport check by the French authorities. Then all 
lorries are screened for clandestines and suspicious 
lorries are routed to deep search facilities where they 
are further inspected by using an alternative method and 
if suspicion is substantiated then lorries are opened for 
visual inspection. In some cases (e.g. if it does not 
interrupt the process flow much, e.g. at non-busy times) 
lorries are opened directly for a quick visual check after 
or instead of being screened. If clandestines are found 
on board a lorry they are removed by the French police, 
registered, and released into freedom. The process on 
the UK site is very similar; the major difference is that 
lorries are searched rather then screened and that only a 
fraction of the lorries going through the system is 
actually searched (at average 33%). The number of 
vehicles searched is on the basis of profiling and 
intelligence. Once the lorries have passed all check 
points they park at the Berth where mobile squads are 
operating to check the lorries a last time before they get 
on their way to Dover. 
 
5.2. Modelling the Real System: A First Approach 
This initial modelling exercise acts as a data 
requirement analysis for our case study. It will help us 
to make informed decisions about the information and 
data we need to collect during our main data collection 
for this case study. Furthermore, it will help us to 
uncover areas where we might encounter problems 
during our main modelling and implementation process 
at an early stage, so that we can respond to it in 
sufficient time. Finally, we want to use our initial 
models to communicate theories, ideas, potential 
investigation techniques, outputs and solutions to stake 
holders and other interested parties. 
Before we started our modelling exercise we 
visited the case study site to observe the operations, for 
discussions with stake holders, and for collecting 
system performance data. From the information 
gathered we developed a conceptual model that reflects 
the current operations of the cargo screening process at 
the ferry port in Calais.  
 
5.2.1. Modelling Challenges 
The case study system presents several modelling 
challenges, some of which have already been mentioned 
in Section 4. Below is a list of the modelling challenges 
we are currently facing. The first challenge is related to 
the fact that we are dealing here with a complex system 
where factors that are difficult to quantify are assumed 
to have a big impact on system behaviour and 
ultimately system performance. An example for such a 
factor is the human decision making process. Therefore, 
the application of abstraction and simplification for the 
purpose of model design is a very delicate issue. 
The second challenge is related to the lack of input 
data. On the one hand we are dealing with rare events 
(e.g. detecting a clandestine) which impacts on the way 
we have to do our input sampling and output analysis 
(Heidelberger 1995) and some data cannot be obtained 
from the real system (e.g. number of clandestines that 
manage to cross the borders) so we have to make a lot 
of guesses. Some mathematical models exist for 
estimate such values as for example success rates for 
clandestine border crossing (Wein, Liu, and Motskin 
2009; Epenshade 1995); their usefulness however is 
debatable as still many assumptions have to be made to 
derive these estimates. Even if we had the resources to 
collect the data there are some legal issues regarding the 
sampling frame which prohibits us to collect some of 
the required data as we are not allowed to sample an 
entire population. 
The third challenge relates to the objects we have 
to model, some of which are fixed and some of which 
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Figure 2: The cargo screening process at Calais 
can be moving around freely. Three different situations 
can be identified: [1] Sensors are fixed and targets 
(lorries and clandestines) are fixed, for example in a 
screening shed lorries are parking while sensors are 
applied. [2] Sensors are moving and targets 
(clandestines) are moving, for example in the allocation 
lanes officers are patrolling and clandestines are 
running around in order to get into the lorries. [3] 
Sensors are moving and targets (lorries and 
clandestines) are fixed, for example in the Berth squads 
are checking the parking lorries either with mobile 
sensors or by opening suspicious lorries directly. While 
the first situation is relatively easy to model using 
traditional Discrete Event Modelling (DEM) the latter 
two require some further reflection before they can be 
modelled successfully. In those cases sensors and/or 
targets need to possess some form of autonomy and 
probably proactiveness which are concepts not directly 
supported by traditional DEM. Agent-Based Modelling 
(ABM) presents an alternative modelling paradigm that 
supports the consideration of autonomy and 
proactiveness of entities. 
The fourth challenge relates to the injection of 
clandestines into the model. Anecdotal evidence 
suggests that clandestines enter the system at numerous 
places. Clandestines either get into the lorries before 
these enter the compound or they climb over the fences 
that surround the compound and get into the lorries 
while they pass through the compound or wait for the 
ferry. While the first is easy to model the latter causes 
some problems as no data is available exactly where 
and when the clandestines enter the compound. 
Finally, the fifth challenge relates to the human 
decision making. The operation of this system is human 
centric and relies very much on the experience of the 
officers and the compliance to rules. Human decision 
making involves the routing (i.e. choosing the lorries to 
be screened), choosing the sensor to be used, 
interpreting the sensor outputs (i.e. choosing the lorries 
to be opened), and compliance to rules (sticking to 
recommended sensor application periods). All these 
points depend very much on the state of the system. At 
peak times decisions will be different compared to quiet 
times, e.g. sensor application periods will be shorter to 
avoid congestion in front of the service sheds and 
therefore the number of true and false negatives will be 
much higher and therefore the detection rates vary 
throughout the day. 
In the end the big question is if modelling all these 
details is really necessary for getting useful results. In 
order to answer this question we will have to implement 
them at least partially and conduct a sensitivity analysis. 
For this purpose we will build some smaller simulation 
models that only represent a small section of the overall 
real system. Once we have the results we can give some 
recommendations regarding the level of detail that is 
required for getting a useful representation of the real 
system. 
 
5.2.2. The Conceptual Model 
In order to capture the cargo screening process taking 
place at the Calais ferry port we have developed a 
process centric conceptual model (Figure 3). It reflects 
the process flow as it appears in the real system. Dark 
blue fields represent system entry and exit points. 
Brown fields represent jump starting points (where the 
text is followed by @) and targets (where the text is 
lead by @). These jumps do not consume any time. 
Light blue fields represent the locations where time is 
consumed. The %s represent flow probabilities while 
the numbers below the light blue fields represent 
detection rates. For confidentiality reasons the true 
values have been replaced by place holders. The splits 
in the model have been defined in a somewhat arbitrary 
way but often a single row represents all activities that 
happen at one specific location. 
 
5.3. Implementation 
Based on our conceptual model presented in Section 
5.2.2 we have developed a first version of a Discrete 
Event Simulation (DES) model which is implemented 
in AnyLogic Version 6.4, a java-based multi-paradigm 
simulation software. The purpose of this exercise is to 
identify where we have gaps in knowledge about the 
system and to identify missing data that could be 
obtained during our main data collection. 
 
5.3.1. Simulation Software 
The object-oriented model design paradigm supported 
by AnyLogic provides for modular, hierarchical, and 
incremental construction of large models (XJ 
Technologies 2009). Each model contains a set of active 
objects which often represent objects found in the real 
world. At the lowest level these active objects can 
contain parameters, variables, functions, events, state 
charts and other active objects. For DES modelling 
there is also a library containing higher-level objects 
that support the creation of discrete event patterns 
frequently used in process-centric modelling (e.g. entity 
generation, buffering, resource usage, entity routing, 
entity destruction). 
One of the benefits of AnyLogic is that you can 
build mixed models, i.e. you can mix process-centric 
DEM and individual based ABM in one hybrid 
simulation model. Technically the main difference is 
that an agent compared to an active object has some 
additional features with respect to dynamic creation and 
destruction, synchronisation, space-, mobility-, and 
spatial animation, agent connections and agent 
communication. We will use these features when we 
model for example sensor and target movement in the 
allocation lanes. 
For our current simulation model we use the 
elements from the library but we have also developed 
our own element in form of embedded active objects 
that contain a collection of parameters, variables and 
library elements. These are reusable components that 
can currently represent any of the service sheds as well 
as passport and ticket booth on the Calais compound.  
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Figure 3: Conceptual model of the cargo screening process at Calais (S=soft sided, H=hard sided, F=French site; 
UK=UK site; x=replacement for real value) 
We tried to make them as generic as possible so that we 
can also use them for modelling other locations or types 
of systems. A screenshot of the elements of such an 
embedded active object is presented in Figure 4. It 
shows a service station with a linked resource pool 
(symbolised by the clock and the linked box) an 
entrance buffer and two single space exit buffers. The 
hold element between entrance queue and service 
station is released to let one entity pass at a time as soon 
as the previously serviced entity has left the exit buffer, 
which only happens if there is some space available in 
one of the upstream queues. The variables on the left 
are used for data collection while the parameters on the 
right allow each instance of this active object class to be 
defined by an individual set of parameters. 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Embedded active object serviceShed 
 
5.3.2. Simulation Model 
Entities of type Lorry (soft and hard sided) are injected 
into the simulation at a certain rate by the source 
element (arrival). Some lorries will arrive with an 
additional load (clandestines) on board. Clandestines 
are currently modelled as resources (a boolean variable 
defines if there are clandestines on board a lorry or not). 
The main elements in the simulation model are the 
serviceShed elements which have been described in 
Section 5.3.1. These are used for modelling the 
situations when we have fixed sensors and fixed targets. 
The serviceShed elements are linked via some routing 
elements. The routing elements use a custom-made 
function which routes the entity to the next level 
upstream element with the shortest queue. This 
represents the routing activities normally conducted by 
an officer. 
Figure 5 displays a section of the simulation model 
within the AnyLogic IDE. The project view window on 
the left shows the project tree of the current project. The 
graphical editor in the middle shows the content of the 
Main object. The pallet window on the right displays 
the different pallets available in AnyLogic, amongst 
them the Enterprise Library pallet. The properties 
window at the bottom is used to define the properties of 
the element, which can contain Java commands and 
method calls. 
Figure 5: A section of the simulation model within the AnyLogic IDE 
For modelling the Berth activities we could not use 
our serviceShed elements as we have a situation with 
moving sensors and fixed targets. Instead we developed 
the solution presented in Figure 6. The moving squads 
are modelled by events that pick one lorry at random 
(mobile CO2 checks will be conducted on soft sided 
lorries while hard sided lorries will be opened) and 
check it. The time it takes to check a lorry is represented 
by the inter arrival time between two events. This 
means that the squads are currently modelled as being 
100% utilised as long as there are lorries to check. 
There are two modus operandi, either lorries can be 
checked only ones (lorries that have been checked 
already are registered on an ignore list) or lorries can be 
checked multiple times (which represents the situation 
where clandestines enter the lorries while these are 
parking at the Berth and therefore the squad would 
check suspicious lorries again). 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Modelling the Berth activities 
 
 To set up the model parameters we had to use some 
best guesses and common sense. However, as we have 
some average input and output data we have tried to use 
settings for the unknown parameters to match the output 
data of the real system when using the input data of the 
real system. A problem is that the available data are 
average data for multiple stations or monthly averages. 
Where ever possible we have used multiple data sources 
for estimating values for the data required (e.g. for 
calculating process flow probabilities). 
 
5.3.3. Current Omissions 
This simulation model presented here represents the 
first draft of our aspired DES model. The main 
simplifications and abstractions in the current model are 
listed below: 
 
• Queues: We use large queue capacities in front 
of the service stations; therefore congestion 
does not occur. However, it is an important 
phenomenon that occurs in the real system and 
influences service times and therefore 
indirectly the detection rates. 
• Average values: We use the same average 
entity arrival rates for the entire simulation 
runtime but the collected data indicates a 
significant difference in arrival rates as well as 
inspection and detection rates depending on 
time of the day and day of the week (the higher 
the arrival rates the lower detection rates, as 
officers have less time for conducting an 
individual screening). However, first we need 
to sort out the congestion problem mentioned 
above; otherwise the impact of high arrival 
rates is not adequately considered in the 
results. 
• Currently we don’t model multiple clandestine 
entry points, canine sniffers nor the search for 
clandestines in the allocation lanes. 
 
5.4. Testing the Simulation Model 
So far we have only conducted some very basic 
preliminary tests with our simulation model. A 
verification and validation exercise is still to be carried 
out. However, here we briefly report on one of the tests 
we have conducted. We have set up the simulation 
model using our standard set of parameter values, 
except for the sensor detection rates, which we have set 
to the same value for all sensors. During the experiment 
we have systematically changed this collective value, 
starting from 0% to 100% in steps of 10%. Our 
simulated runtime was equivalent to a one year period 
and we conducted 20 replications for each set of values. 
As for the results we expect to see a non-linear 
relationship between sensor detection rates and the 
average proportions of clandestines detected. This is 
due to the fact that many lorries will go through several 
screening procedures and therefore combinatorial 
effects appears for this relationship, where higher 
individual sensor detection rates will have a 
proportionally lower benefit regarding the system 
detection rate. Figure 7 confirms our expectation. 
This first test has already shown the impact of 
modelling rare events. We observed that the clandestine 
detection rates vary significantly throughout most of the 
simulation runtime and seems only to stabilise towards 
the end. Furthermore, we noticed some significant 
differences between runs. Therefore, in future we have 
to assess very carefully the required warm-up period, 
run length and number of replications.  
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper we have presented our first steps towards 
the development of a cargo-screening process simulator 
and we have introduced a case study that we want to use 
for gaining some experience with developing such a 
simulator. Our current task is to conduct a data 
requirement analysis. For this we have created a first 
draft of our aspired DES model to be used for the cargo-
screening process simulator. This modelling exercise 
has allowed us to make a well informed decision about 
which kind of information and data we require for 
representing the real system to allow some useful 
systems analysis. 
We found that a big challenge when modelling the 
case study system is to capture the variability inherent 
in the system. By omitting details like differences in 
arrival rates throughout the day and week, congestion in 
front of service sheds and associated with this service 
time variation and detection rate variations we do not 
get a good representation of the real system, in 
particular when we are not only interested in the 
average system performance but also want to gain an 
insight into its operations. We are currently working on 
the mechanisms to implement varying arrival rate and 
the consequences of these, i.e. congestion and varying 
service times. Once we have conducted our main data 
collection we will add some real data to it. Once this is 
done we will work on verification and validation of the 
simulation model. 
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